Advisory Service
Identity & Multi-Cloud Security
Converge identity across Azure, AWS, and GCP with zero-trust architecture and non-human identity governance—before fragmented access controls become your largest attack surface.
The Problem: What Goes Wrong Without Identity Convergence
IT/OT Identity Separation
Operational technology environments maintain separate identity systems from IT. When IT and OT converge for efficiency, the identity gap creates lateral movement paths that bypass IT security controls.
Non-Human Identity Explosion
Service accounts, API keys, machine identities, and automation credentials proliferate across clouds. These non-human identities often have excessive privileges, never rotate credentials, and lack monitoring—becoming persistent backdoors.
Multi-Cloud Identity Sprawl
Each cloud provider maintains its own IAM. Users and services authenticate differently to Azure, AWS, and GCP. Privilege creep occurs independently, and no single view shows effective permissions across environments.
Privileged Access Gaps
Standing privileged access persists across infrastructure. Administrators maintain always-on access to production systems. When credentials are compromised, attackers inherit persistent privileges.
Failure Patterns We See
- An attacker pivots from a compromised OT device to IT Active Directory because the OT domain trusts were configured for convenience without security review.
- A 3-year-old service account with domain admin privileges is used in a ransomware attack—no one knew it existed or what it was for.
- A security review reveals 847 service accounts across Azure, AWS, and on-premises—fewer than 200 have documented owners.
- An auditor asks for a list of all privileged users across clouds. The response takes three weeks and is still incomplete.
- Standing admin access allows an insider to exfiltrate data for months before detection.
What Changes in 30–90 Days
Identity Inventory Completed
Comprehensive mapping of human and non-human identities across IT, OT, and all cloud environments with privilege analysis.
Non-Human Identity Governance
Service account and API key inventory with ownership assignment, rotation policies, and least-privilege remediation.
IT/OT Identity Strategy
Architecture for converged identity that maintains OT isolation while enabling secure management and monitoring.
Privileged Access Controls
Just-in-time access for administrative functions replacing standing privileges with auditable, time-bounded access.
Multi-Cloud Identity Fabric
Unified identity governance across Azure, AWS, and GCP with federated access and consistent policy enforcement.
Identity Threat Detection
Monitoring for identity-based attacks: impossible travel, privilege escalation, and anomalous service account behaviour.
How We Work
Phase 1
Discovery & Assessment
- Human and non-human identity inventory
- IT/OT identity mapping
- Multi-cloud privilege analysis
- Current state architecture review
Phase 2
Strategy & Architecture
- Zero-trust identity architecture
- IT/OT convergence strategy
- Non-human identity governance model
- Privileged access management design
Phase 3
Non-Human Identity Remediation
- Service account ownership assignment
- Credential rotation implementation
- Least-privilege remediation
- API key governance
Phase 4
Privileged Access Implementation
- Just-in-time access deployment
- Privileged identity management
- Session recording and monitoring
- Break-glass procedures
Phase 5
Multi-Cloud & IT/OT Integration
- Cloud identity federation
- IT/OT trust architecture
- Conditional access for OT
- Unified monitoring
Phase 6
Transition & Operations
- Identity governance processes
- Operational runbooks
- Team training
- Continuous improvement cadence
Deliverables
- Identity and Access Inventory Report
- Non-Human Identity Register
- Zero-Trust Identity Architecture
- IT/OT Identity Convergence Strategy
- Privileged Access Management Design
- Service Account Governance Policies
- Credential Rotation Procedures
- Just-in-Time Access Runbooks
- Multi-Cloud Federation Design
- Identity Threat Detection Rules
- Operational Playbooks
- Board-Ready Identity Risk Report
Timeline & Stakeholders
Typical Timeline
12–16 weeks for comprehensive identity program. Phased approaches available starting with non-human identity or privileged access.
Stakeholder Engagement
- Executive Sponsor: CISO, CIO, or CTO
- Identity Team: IAM engineers, directory services
- Cloud Teams: Azure, AWS, GCP administrators
- OT/Operations: Plant managers, OT engineers
- Security: SOC, incident response
Proof: Industry Examples
Aviation & Simulation
Flight Simulation Company
A global simulation provider operated separate identity systems for IT environments and OT-connected simulators. We designed a converged identity architecture using Semperis for AD resilience, implemented just-in-time access for simulator maintenance, and reduced the privileged identity attack surface by 73%.
Manufacturing
Industrial Equipment Manufacturer
A manufacturer discovered 1,247 service accounts across Azure, AWS, and on-premises—612 had no documented owner. We implemented non-human identity governance, assigned ownership, established rotation policies, and decommissioned 389 unused accounts. Incident response time for identity-based alerts improved from hours to minutes.
What We Will Not Do
- Ignore non-human identities: We do not secure human access while leaving service accounts, API keys, and machine identities unmanaged.
- Converge without isolation: We do not merge IT and OT identity without maintaining appropriate security boundaries and monitoring.
- Accept standing privileges: We do not leave always-on administrative access in place when just-in-time alternatives are viable.
- Create paper governance: We do not deliver identity policies without implementation and operational handover.
Secure Your Identity Layer
Request an assessment to understand your identity attack surface and create a roadmap to zero-trust identity governance.